INTRODUCTION
definitions generate. A recent review of the now extensive literature on reflective practice in nursing indicates that two approaches SINGLE AND DOUBLE-LOOP LEARNING tend to predominate. The first approach promotes singleloop learning, and the second double-loop learning. The concepts of single and double-loop learning arise from Argyris and Schon's theory of action (Argyris & Schon These differing approaches are underpinned by a range of definitions of reflective practice which, in turn, gener-1974 , 1978 , Argyris 1976 , 1980 , 1982 , 1985 , Argyris et al. 1985 which views human agents as designers of action. ate different frameworks for reflective practice. Interestingly, approaches to the promotion of reflective According to these authors, human agents design action to achieve certain ends or consequences and they monitor practice appear to differ between the United Kingdom and Australia.
ongoing action and its consequences to assess its effectiveness. Human agents make sense of the contexts within In this paper I will argue that double-loop learning is the aim of all seriously reflective practitioners in nursing which they function by constructing mental representations or concepts of them and these, in turn, guide the but, somewhat paradoxically, that this will be best achieved through a conflation of British 'single-loop' and design of action. By monitoring the relative effectiveness of action, therefore, human agents also monitor the Australian 'double-loop' approaches. In order to do this I will define single and double-loop learning and critically adequacy of their constructions of the contexts in which such action takes place. review dominant approaches to reflective practice in the United Kingdom and Australia. This will involve both a
The constructions of contexts and prescriptions for action that are designed to achieve desired outcomes in review of the definitions of reflective practice which oper-them are known as action theories (Argyris & Schon 1974) .
Reflection-on-action is rather different. It involves a 'cognitive post-mortem' (Greenwood 1993) where a pracAction theories are of two types, namely espoused theories and theories in use. Espoused theories are the theories to titioner reviews her actions to explore again the understandings she brought to them ('used' in them) in which human agents claim allegiance, whereas, and as their name implies, theories-in-use are the theories which the light of her outcomes. Greenwood (1993) views this Schonian model of reflecmanifest in, or can be inferred from, action.
What this implies is that human action may or may not tive practice as essentially flawed in that it fails to recognize the importance of reflection-before-action. Reflection be consistent with a person's espoused theories but it is always consistent with her theories-in-use. Human action before action involves thinking through what one wants to do and how one intends to do it before one actually is never accidental nor atheoretical. As Argyris et al. (1985 p. 82) argue, people 'do not just happen to act in a particu-does it. To fail to reflect before action may lead to error; in addition, and related to this, it allows an important lar way. Rather, their action is designed; and, as agents, they are responsible for the design'. opportunity for feedback to go begging.
To Boud et al. (1985) reflection entails returning to the Of course, theories-in-use may not be explicitly held; many are tacit and can be made explicit through reflection experience, attending to feelings and re-evaluating the experience. When an agent returns to the experience, she on action (Schon 1983 (Schon , 1987 . They may also be rendered explicit when their adequacy and/or accuracy is discon-recaptures it in as much detail and richness as possible.
She also attends to the feelings the experience excited; she firmed or challenged, that is, when they fail to achieve the desired consequences. In this event, human agents may enjoys the positive feelings it elicited and surfaces and deals with any negative feelings. She then re-evaluates the respond in two ways. Firstly, they may search for other means (action theory) to achieve the same end. This level experience by relating what she has learned through this experience to her existing knowledge structures by menof response, i.e. merely to change the actions intended to lead to the same outcomes, is what Argyris et al. (1985) tally testing her new understandings in new contexts and by making the knowledge gained her own. term single-loop learning. The second type of response reflects double-loop learning. In double-loop learning the In response to criticism that this early model of reflective practice gave insufficient emphasis to preparation for agent does not merely search for alternative actions to achieve her same ends; she also examines the appropriate-experience, Boud (1992) revised this model to include preparation. Three things are focused on when preparing ness and propriety of her chosen ends. Double-loop learning therefore involves reflection on values and norms and, by for experience. These are what the learners bring to the event and what they want from it (the personal), what implication, the social structures which were instrumental in their development and which render them meaningful. constraints and opportunities the event provides (the context) and how learners can acquire what they need from By reflecting on the world they are instrumental in creating, human agents can learn to change it in ways that are more the event (the learning strategies). congruent with the values and theories they espouse.
THE PURPOSES OF REFLECTIVE PRACTICE REFLECTIVE PRACTICE
It has already been noted, above, that Argyris & Schon (1974) , Schon (1983 Schon ( , 1987 and Argyris et al. (1985) view Views on the nature of reflective practice appear to differ. To Schon (1983 Schon ( , 1987 it has two components, to Boud the purpose of reflective practice to be the creation of a world that more faithfully reflects the values and beliefs et al. (1985) it has three; similarly, Greenwood (1993) believes it has three, whereas Boud (1992) believes it has of people in it, through the construction or revision of people's action theories. four.
To Schon, reflective practice involves reflection-inIt has also been noted that, according to these same scholars, this will entail double-loop learning because creating action and reflection-on-action. Reflection-in-action means to think what one is doing while one is doing it; it is more desirable social realities requires structural as well as action redesign. typically stimulated by surprise, by something which puzzles the practitioner concerned. As the practitioner Other scholars' views accord with this; more precisely, reflective practice allows practitioners to: tries to make sense of the situation she confronts she reflects on the understandings which have been implicit in her actions, her feelings which led to the adoption of $ develop individual theories of nursing, to influence practice and generate nursing knowledge (Emden 1991, this particular course of action and the way she structured her problem(s) initially. She surfaces all these, restructures Reid 1993); $ advance theory at a conceptual level to lead to changes them and embodies them in future action. Reflection-inaction therefore allows her to redesign what she is doing at professional, social and political levels (Emden 1991 , Smyth 1992 ); while she is doing it.
$ facilitate integration of theory and practice FRAMEWORKS FOR REFLECTION (McCougherty 1991 , Wong et al. 1995 , Landeen et al. 1995 ; Boud et al's (1985) and Boud's (1992) views on appropriate frameworks have already been mentioned. These relate $ allow the correction of distortions and errors in beliefs related to discrete activities, and the values and norms more readily to school learning, in general; no distinction is made between levels of learner or relative expertise of which underpin them (Mezirow 1990 , Saylor 1990 ); $ encourage an holistic, individualized and flexible learners. In nursing, the literature is rather different. For example, Smith & Russell (1991) , Paterson (1994) and approach to care (Chinn & Jacobs 1987); $ allow the identification, description and resolution of Burrows (1995) all discuss the value of reflective practice in pre-registration education and at least one of them practical problems through deliberative rationalization (Powell 1989) ; (Burrows 1995) recognizes that many students will have little to reflect on. This may account for the apparent sim-$ enhance self-esteem through learning (Keegan 1988 , Johns 1994 ; plicity of their reflective frameworks ((see Figure 1 for Burrows (1995) framework and Figure 2 for that of Smith $ heighten the visibility of the therapeutic work of nurses ( Johns 1994 ( Johns , 1995 ; & Russell (1991)).
A much more elaborate framework, one based on $ enable the monitoring of increasing effectiveness over time ( Johns 1995 , Landeen et al. 1995 Carper's (1978) ways of knowing nursing, has been used extensively in post-registration education by Johns (1994, $ enable nurses to explore and come to understand the nature and boundaries of their own role and that of 1995); this is represented in Figure 3 , below.
Readers will notice immediately that these frameworks other health professionals ( Johns 1994 ( Johns , 1995 ; $ lead to an understanding of the conditions under which are almost exclusively single-loop orientated. The only possible exception might be those questions included practitioners practice and, in particular, the barriers that limit the practitioners' therapeutic potential (Emden under 'ethics' in Johns (1995) utilization of Carper's (1978) ways of knowing. Importantly, however, none of these 1991, Johns 1994, 1995); $ lead to an acceptance of professional responsibility frameworks contain questions which are deliberately double-loop orientated. ( Johns 1994 ( Johns , 1995 ; $ allow a shift in the social control of work. Less direct, This seems interesting in (at least) two respects. Firstly, Johns (1995) recognizes that resolution of differences overt surveillance over work and much more indirect forms of control through, e.g. teamwork, partnerships, between actual and desirable practice may be difficult due to the social norms and barriers embedded both within the collaboration, etc. (Smyth 1992 (Smyth , 1993 ; $ provide opportunity to shift the power to determine practitioner and the social environment. Indeed, he goes what counts as knowledge from an elite, distant from the workplace, to practitioners in the workplace (Smyth $ Background to the incident -time, place, location.
1992, 1993);
$ Details of what happened -your account and/or $ allow the generation of a knowledge base that is more accounts of others.
comprehensive because it is directly tuned into what
$ What your concerns and thoughts were at the time.
practitioners know about practice (Smyth 1992 (Smyth , 1993 );
$ What you found most demanding about the incident.
$ provide the opportunity for a rapid and progressive $ What you consider the incident is important to reflect refocusing of work activity (Smyth 1992 (Smyth , 1993 .
upon.
It was also noted previously that Argyris & Schon (1974) , Figure 1 Smith and Russel's (1991) framework for reflection on Schon (1983 Schon ( , 1987 and Argyris et al. (1985) believe that action based on Gordon D. and Benner P. 'Guidelines for recording double-loop learning is essential to the creation of desircritical incidents ', in Benner P. (1984) Novice to Expert, Addisonable social worlds since their creation hinges on the rede-Wesley, London, pp. 299-302). sign of social structures as well as human action. The aim of double-loop learning, however, is not apparent in many of the frameworks for reflection currently being suggested.
$ Describe events as you understood them.
By 'framework' I mean either a series of questions which $ Describe your feelings about this event.
are designed to prompt nurses' reflection on action (e.g.
$ What have you learned from this event?
$ Given a similar situation in future, how would you Smyth 1993 , Johns 1995 or guidelines to structure reflecbehave?
tion on action (e.g. Smith & Russell 1991 , Burrows 1995 .
$ In what ways do the theories of psychology, sociology, Alsop (1995) terms these 'protocols'.
biology, philosophy and nursing research underpin the situation you have witnessed? science and therefore less helpful than Johns (1995) framework irrespective of the latter's single-loop One mechanism some nurses have adopted in western Sydney to address these limitations is to conflate John's so far as to suggest that learning through reflection is an emancipatory activity. There is clearly some inconsistency reflective framework with aspects of Kemmis & McTaggart's (1988) more overtly double-loop or critical between Johns' views relating to the purpose of reflection and the framework he uses to promote it. Given the terms guidelines.
Of course, these guidelines were developed to promote of the framework as it currently stands, it is at least arguable that 'emancipation' could be construed to mean, critical action research (Carr & Kemmis 1986 , Kemmis & McTaggart 1988 ; however, critical action research begins 'liberation from ineffective (but discrete) action'.
Secondly, and even allowing that the scholars concerned and ends in critical reflection on action. Kemmis & McTaggart (1988) believe that human agents (Smith & Russell 1991 , Paterson 1994 , Burrows 1995 may be responding to the relative lack of knowledge of pre-create and recreate their social worlds through: registration nursing students, single-loop learning has Argyris C. (1976) Increasing Leadership Effectiveness. John Wiley, recognizing Spradley's (1980) is embedded. 
